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ABSTRACT:

China‘s urban residential communities are currently facing mounting levels of
water scarcity with the potential to impact social and even possibly political stability.
China‘s central government is currently attempting to mitigate such potential risk by
adopting a variety of projects aimed at combating potable water shortages. This paper
sets out to analyze three of the national projects adopted by China‘s central government
to combat critical residential water shortages currently affecting China‘s urban areas. The
three projects are South North River Transfer Project, the adoption of tiered water pricing
system, and the construction of desalinization facilities in some coastal cities. Each of
these projects distributional equality, political feasibility, cost effectiveness, and
environmental impact will be examined so as to determine which serves as the best viable
solution to China‘s current water shortages. The variety of these projects suggests a
single policy will be unable to provide a complete solution to China‘s residential water
shortages. Rather the direness of China‘s urban water scarcity will require the
simultaneous adoption of multiple policies to fully address the potable water needs of
China‘s urban residential communities.
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INTRODUCTION:
China‘s former Premier Wen Jibiao, was not simply being an alarmist when he stated in
1999, that ―the survival of the Chinese nation is threatened by the country's shortage of
water.‖1Today China faces water shortages that threaten to undermine the nation‘s social,
economic and political prosperity. Although, this research is limited in scope to the water
shortages affecting China‘s urban residential communities and their associated solutions, finding
a viable solution to these communities current water shortages will likely have a sizable impact
on China‘s overall level of water shortages, as China‘s urban residential areas represent the
country‘s largest population centers. China‘s central government is currently exploring a variety
of options including solutions that focus on increasing the supply of potable water in urban
residential areas, the South North River Transfer (SNRT) project and the construction of
desalination facilities, as well as a solution aimed at curbing urban residential demand for
potable water, the implementation of an increasing block tariff (IBT) pricing scheme. In terms of
the projects‘ political feasibly, cost effectiveness, distributional equality, and environmental
impact each of the three solutions has its own individual strengths and weakness.
Overall, this research seeks to compare the individual projects along the same criteria to
determine which holds the potential to provide a viable solution to the water shortages currently
facing China‘s urban residential communities. The project which is best able to not only find a
sustainable tradeoff between cost effectiveness and environmental impact, but is also able to
balance decreasing water demand, encouraging water conservation with increasing the supply of
potable water in China‘s urban residential areas, will be the one determined to be the most viable
1

McAlister, J. 2005. 'China‘s water crisis,‖' Deutsche Bank AG Asia-Pacific Equity Research. March 22.
http://www.cbiz.cn/download/aquabio.pdf
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of the three projects. This research is focused on examining the projects already adopted by
China‘s central government in order to determine which among them represents the most
practical long term solution to water shortages in China‘s urban residential communities.
The ideal solution to China‘s urban residential potable water shortages would be a project
or multiple projects that are able to be both economical and environmentally friendly, while still
individualized enough to suit the specific water needs of a given community. Additionally,
China‘s central government should seek to incentivize water conservation and try to strike a
balance between decreasing residential demand for potable water and simultaneously increasing
the available supply of potable water. Overall, the three projects disused in this paper will be
compared against these criteria.

2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

Outline of Research Breakdown:
This paper, apart from the overall introduction and conclusion is divided into four major
chapters. The first chapter is a discussion of the impact of continued water shortages in China.
This chapter lays out a timeline for the depletion of potable water in China‘s urban residential
areas. It also provides context on the extent of China‘s current water shortages, and provides a
framework for the other three projects that gives justification for this research by outlining the
importance of implementing a plan to solve effectively the current water urban residential water
shortages in China.
The remaining three chapters examine of three different projects currently being
implemented by China‘s central government to combat China‘s urban residential water shortages.
The three projects are the SNRT project, an IBT water pricing scheme, and the construction of
desalination facilities, each of which will be compared along the same four predetermined
criteria. Each of these three chapters is subdivided into six major subsections. These six
subsections include a project background explanation, an examination of the project‘s
distributional equality, political feasibility, cost effectiveness, environmental impact, and then a
discussion of that particular project‘s overall conclusions. All of the projects are compared along
the same criteria in order to determine which project represents the most effective model for
combatting urban residential water scarcity in China.

3

Justification of Chosen Projects:
Although a more specific explanation of each project will be provided in the background
section of chapters two through four, the three projects were chosen because each is state
sponsored approach, undertaken by the Chinese government towards combating urban residential
water shortages. As each of the three projects is to some extent being introduced on a national
level and is backed by the Chinese central government, there is enough commonality between
the projects to compare them effectively along similar criteria. There is also enough variety
among the projects to gauge the relative effectiveness of the different approaches to combating
China‘s residential water shortages. This allows for comparison between projects that are
increasing the supply of potable water to those that are oriented towards decreasing demand of
water. As these three policies represent a spectrum of China‘s response to current urban
residential water shortages, by comparing them along the four predetermined criteria this
research will be able to judge the inherent strengths and weakness of each approach as it is suited
for success in China.

Definition of the Four Criteria:
This section provides a basic definition of each of the four criteria used to evaluate the
potential success of each of the three projects in combating China‘s urban residential water
shortages. These criteria include each project‘s distributional equality, political feasibility, cost
effectiveness, and environmental impact. Although the specific examples discussed in each
chapter will be adapted to be relevant to each of the three projects, the following definitions
provide a basic explanation of the aspects of each project that will be evaluated by the individual
criteria.
4

Distributional Equality:
This section will evaluate the extent to which the potential benefits of each of the three
projects are equally distributed across China. This section will primarily take into account
disparities in the geographic distribution of each project, particularity in terms of the divide
between Northern and Southern China. When relevant this section will include an examination of
the extent to which each project benefits certain regions of China (typically Northern China) at
the expense of other regions (typically Southern China). This includes drawing conclusions
about potential threats to social stability and increases in social tension due to policies that
unevenly distribute water.

Political Feasibility:
This section will examine the political commitment of China‘s central government to the
successful implementation of each of the individual projects. This includes examining factors
that incentivize government and party commitment to the projects. This section will also look at
how the unique political structure of China as an authoritarian state, has influenced the
structuring and potential success of each project of each individual project.

Cost Effectiveness:
This will be the most quantitative of the four criteria sections. This section will examine
the overall cost of fully implementing each of the three projects, as well as the economic benefits
and limitations of each project. This will include both initial costs of the projects, as well as
future financial costs of continuing the projects, and when relevant the financial stress added to
local economies by the project. The section will discuss the economic and financial impacts
5

uniquely associated with each of the three projects, in an attempt to determine the most cost
effective means of combating water shortages in China‘s urban residential areas.

Environmental Impact:
This section will examine the overall impact each of the three projects has had on the
urban residential water situation in China in terms of increasing supply, decreasing demand, and
environmental conservation. The section will consider both the short and long term
environmental impacts of the each of the three projects. This section will take into consideration
the environment costs of each of the three projects, including the potential for pollution and the
threat to biodiversity. Overall, this section seeks to determine the ability of each project to
decrease water shortages while simultaneously minimizing the risk of environmental damage.

6

CHAPTER 1: THE THREAT OF WATER SHORTAGES IN CHINA

1. 1 Background of China’s Water Shortages:
There is a fundamental shortage of potable water in China. China currently has 21% of
the world‘s population, but only 6% of the world‘s potable water.2 This situation is further
exacerbated by the fact that China‘s water resources are not equally distributed across the
country, 43% of China‘s population lives in Northern China, but this region only holds 19.6% of
the country‘s water resources.3 The problem of e water shortages in China is likely only to be
compounded over the next couple decades as China‘s population is projected to continue to
increase, while the nation‘s supply of potable water will likely decrease.4
By 2033, China‘s per capita natural freshwater resources will likely decline to only 1,875
cubic meters, down from 2,156 cubic meters in 2007, when China‘s freshwater resources already
ranked among the lowest per capita for a major country.5 China‘s water crisis has grown so dire
that according to Chinese officials ―by 2030 [China‘s] water use will reach or approach the total
volume of exploitable water resources.‖6 Overall, China‘s central government must implement
new solutions to combat water shortages in order to preserve China‘s social stability, economic
growth, agricultural security, and prevent China from running out of potable water.

2

Wong, Gabriel. "China's War on Water Scarcity." Gridlines, 2013. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projectsinfrastructure/assets/chinas-war-on-water-scarcity.pdf.
3
"Urbanization and Economic Growth." Part II Supporting Reports.
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/Urban-China-SRs1-3.pdf.
4
Zhang, Henry H., and David Brown. "Understanding Urban Residential Water Use in Beijing and Tianjin,
China." Habitat International 29 (2004).
http://www.colorado.edu/geography/class_homepages/geog_4501_sm06/WCChina.pdf.
5
"China‘s Water Crisis Part II – Water Facts At A Glance." China Water Risk, 2010. http://chinawaterrisk.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/Chinas-Water-Crisis-Part-2.pdf.
6
Buckley, Chris. "China Says Water Supplies Exploited by 2030." Reuters. December 14, 2007.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/14/environment-china-drought-dc-idUKPEK13275320071214.
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1.2 Exasperation of Urbanization:
In China in the early 1990s a new wave of economic reforms gradually encouraged rural
to urban migration, by 1990 approximately 26% of China‘s population lived in urban areas. 7 As
a result of China‘s Opening Up and Reform Policy, and the increasing economic opportunities
available, urbanization rapidly increased in China such that for the first time in 2011 the majority
of China‘s population (51.3%) lived in urban areas.8 This rapid urbanization has had a twofold
impact on potable water in China‘s urban area.
First, this increase in population places many areas in China under increased water stress.
As of 2013, 60% of China‘s 660 cities were classified as short of water.9 Additionally, 108 cities,
including China‘s capital Beijing, face the threat of ―serious water shortages‖.10 Beijing, a city
that has experienced some of the highest levels of population growth, current water recourses
only amount for 230 cubic meters of fresh water per capita.11 This is considered ―far below the
world water poverty mark.‖12 Despite policies such as the one child policy aimed at curbing
population growth, China‘s central government has been unable to stifle increasing population
growth and particularly swelling populations in urban areas that place increasing pressures on an
already limited source of freshwater resources in China.
Second, the rapid urbanization and economic growth in China has resulted in increased
levels of water pollution. This pollution has affected China‘s current potable water resource
7

Jia, Lili, and Chao Bao. "Residential Fresh Water Demand in China." ZEF Working Paper 126 (2014).
http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefnews/wp126.pdf.
8
Ibid., 6
9
Wong, Gabriel. "China's War on Water Scarcity." Gridlines, 2013. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projectsinfrastructure/assets/chinas-war-on-water-scarcity.pdf.
10
"Urbanization and Economic Growth." Part II Supporting Reports.
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/Urban-China-SRs1-3.pdf.
11
Ibid., 1
12
Ibid., 1
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situation by causing drinking water standards in roughly half of China‘s cities to fall below
provincial drinking water quality standards.13 China‘s numerous urban development projects, and
many industrial plants, which have sprung up as a result of China‘s rapid urbanization, have only
aggravated the pollution of lakes and aquifers in China.

1.3 The Threat of Water Shortages in Beijing
Beijing, like many other cities suffers from natural geographic water shortages of
Northern China, exacerbated by the city‘s growing population and rapid industrialization.
However, such urban residential water shortages are perhaps more precarious in Beijing than in
any other Chinese city, because Beijing is China‘s capital. The central government is committed
to preventing Beijing from running out of potable water, because doing so could threaten the
social and political stability of China.
Beijing currently is suffering from a water shortage on par with many countries in the
Middle East.14 Some experts such as Xu Xinyi, Director of the Beijing Normal University
College of Water Sciences, blame these water shortages on overpopulation, which continue to
place incredibly high demands on the city‘s already overstretched aquifers.15 However, certain
―local government and business [practices that have] recklessly pursu[ed] quick money by
developing projects that devoured resources and caused serious pollution,‖ have likely worsened
Beijing‘s already grim water situation.16

13

Ibid., 4
LIn, Luna. "Beijing Water Shortages Worse than the Middle East." China Dialogue, 2013. http://urban-africachina.angonet.org/sites/default/files/resource_files/beijing_water_shortage_-_chinadialogue_29_aug_2013.pdf.
15
Roberts, Dexter. "China's Water Supply Is Contaminated and Shrinking." Bloomberg. November 19, 2014.
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-19/chinas-water-supply-is-contaminated-and-shrinking.
16
Ibid.,1
14
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Although the problem of potable water shortages is not unique to Beijing, the situation is
made more dire because as the capital city Beijing is the center of the government and the
Communist Party power in China. Therefore, reports that Beijing residents have been driven to
dig illegal wells as a means of combating local water shortages represents the critical point
reached by the water shortages in Beijing.17 China‘s central government simply cannot afford to
let Beijing run out of potable water, doing would likely cause irreparable damage the Communist
Party‘s image, framing them as unable to even provide the most basic of resources to the people
of their own capital. This in turn would likely also incite social and political instability.
It is likely as a result of the high stakes associated with maintaining a state of water
stability in China‘s capital that all of the projects addressed in this paper are in some way aimed
at alleviating water shortages in Beijing. The magnitude of the projects into which China‘s
central government is willing to invest, particularly the SNRT project, in order to combat
residential water shortages in Beijing demonstrates the national political importance of
mitigating residential potable water shortages in the city.

1.4 Domestic Business Implications:
China‘s current water shortages if not reversed or at the very least stabilized will likely
threaten to undermine the remarkable economic progress achieved by China over the last thirty
years. Chronic water shortages and resulting high levels of pollution in major natural freshwater
sources, such as the Yangtze River, could result in China becoming a less attractive destination
for foreign companies. Foreign businesses are going to be unlikely to invest in a country facing a
chronic shortage of natural resources particularly a resource as critical as water. Freshwater is
17

Economy, Elizabeth. "China's Growing Water Crisis." World Politics Review. August 9, 2011.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9684/chinas-growing-water-crisis#.
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not only important to many manufacturing processes, but also the use of coal power, China‘s current
major source of fuel is a process that is incredibly water intensive.18 As a result of these, and
possibly other factors, China‘s levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) would likely fall should
China‘s central government fail to enact a viable solution to China‘s current problems of water
scarcity.
Decreases in FDI would hurt China‘s overall economic growth, as many sectors such as
manufacturing, have become relatively reliant on high levels of FDI to sustain their business
models. In this way failing to solve China‘ water shortages pose a direct threat to China‘s
miraculous economic growth. A lack of the basic natural resources, such as potable water, would
cause China to become an undesirable market for expanding foreign companies and their
resulting investment and capital.

1.5 Implications for Regional Relationships
Although the focus of this paper is primarily China‘s domestic response to urban
residential potable water shortages it would be incomplete to assume that water shortages, and
the solutions enacted to resolve them did not affect China‘s relationships with its regional
neighbors in South Asia, several of whom also suffer of similar water shortages.
Perhaps the most significant of these regional relationships effect by China‘s current
water policy is the Sin-India relationship. The western route of the SNRT project, though
currently still in planning phases, will divert water from the head of the Yangtze River at the
Himalayan plateau.19 This project will potentially have large political consequences for China as
construction of the proposed dams on the Brahmaputra and Mekong Rivers are very likely to
18

Wong, Gabriel. "China's War on Water Scarcity." Gridlines, 2013. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/capital-projectsinfrastructure/assets/chinas-war-on-water-scarcity.pdf.
19
"China Tries to Overcome Its Water Limitations." Stratfor. June 11, 2013.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-tries-overcome-its-water-limitations.
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have an impact on downstream countries that include India, Bangladesh and Vietnam. Although
China‘s central government claims that the project would only siphon off approximately 1% of
the run-off from the Brahmaputra River, there has still been much uproar in India against the
project that is seen as potentially threatening India‘s own limited water resources.20 The fact that
the majority of western route of the SNRT project is located in the contested Tibetan
autonomous region only further complicates potential water conflicts and provides strategic
motivation for China to maintain control over the water supply.
Since 1950, when China and India first established formal diplomatic relations, the two
countries‘ relationships, though previously characterized by border disputes and armed conflicts,
have since the 1980s found common ground in economic cooperation.21 Thus, the two countries‘
relationship has been relatively stable, though perhaps not overly friendly.22 India currently
suffers from its own potable water shortages, a situation that like in China is made worse by
India‘s growing population.23
Given the history between Sino-Indian relations, as well as the increasing severity of the
future water shortages facing both countries, it is possible that the western route of the SNRT
project could create a potential hotspot as the world‘s two most populous countries compete for
20

Das, Rup Narayan. "India-China Relations A New Paradigm." Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2013.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&ur
l=http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph19.pdf&ei=Dzs1VfzTOMwogSLlICwCA&usg=AFQjCNHudwoGTciO3qqjDStFma86BItJaQ&sig2=6gLzPs65BX1SyG4STdbUw&bvm=bv.91071109,d.b2w.
21
Arif, Sheikh Mohd. "A History of Sino-Indian Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation."International Journal of
Political Science and Development 4 (2013): 129-37.
http://www.academicresearchjournals.org/IJPSD/PDF/December/Arif.pdf.
22
Southerland, Matthew, Iacob Koch-Weser, and Angela Zhang. "China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite
Growing Cooperation." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 2014.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff Report_China-India Relations--Tensions Persist
Despite Growing Cooperation_12 22 2014.pdf.
23
Das, Rup Narayan. "India-China Relations A New Paradigm." Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2013.
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&ur
l=http://idsa.in/system/files/Monograph19.pdf&ei=Dzs1VfzTOMwogSLlICwCA&usg=AFQjCNHudwoGTciO3qqjDStFma86BItJaQ&sig2=6gLzPs65BX1SyG4STdbUw&bvm=bv.91071109,d.b2w.
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control over the same water source. In this way China‘s own plans to increase their supply of
potable water as a means to maintain domestic stability may instead jeopardize their political ties
with regional neighbors.

1.6 Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations
Finally, it is important to briefly analyze the implications of China‘s current water
shortages on Sino-U.S. relations, as the United States-China relationship is currently the most
important bilateral relationship in the international community. Overall, the impact of Chinese
water shortages on Sino-U.S. relations is threefold.
First, chronic water shortages in China will likely have an impact on the two countries‘
economic relations. As discussed earlier in this chapter, water shortages will probably make
China a less attractive market for foreign investment, and will also impact China‘s
manufacturing sector that is highly dependent on coal based energy. The United States as
China‘s biggest trading partner would potentially feel the economic impact of a drop in Chinese
manufacturing, particularly of a drop in manufactured goods typically exported to the United
States. China‘s inability to maintain its natural resources may also drive certain U.S. companies
to start to invest in countries other than China.
Secondly, In terms of regional security, the United States has a vested interest in
maintaining the regional stability of East Asia.24 Should China‘s central government be unable to
sufficiently solve current water shortages, or pursue plan of water development that their
neighbors perceive as overly aggressive it is possible that a water war could erupt in East Asia.
An international conflict over water in Asia has the potential to escalate and disrupt the balance
24

Southerland, Matthew, Iacob Koch-Weser, and Angela Zhang. "China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite
Growing Cooperation." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 2014.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff Report_China-India Relations--Tensions Persist
Despite Growing Cooperation_12 22 2014.pdf.
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of power in the region. As many of the United States‘ largest trading partners and important
allies are located in the region, as well as the United States‘ strong military presence in the
Pacific, a regional conflict over resources such as water would have a large impact on United
States‘ foreign policy.25
Finally, should the three projects discussed in this paper prove to be insufficient in
supplying China with water a continued supply of water, it is possible that China may begin to
seek out relationships with other countries in order to secure a partnership to provide access to
potable water. Should China pursue such a policy of expanding their global hegemony as a
means of securing access to other countries‘ water resources, this would likely affect Sino-U.S.
relations, as such an increase in China‘s global influence may be perceived as a potential threat
to the United States‘ soft power.

1.7 Chapter Conclusions
Overall, this chapter provides a background on the extent of the water shortages currently
facing China, as well as provides brief explanation as to the possible of the business, diplomatic,
and security repercussions if China‘s central government fails to reverse current urban potable
water scarcity. Although the repercussions and scenarios discussed in this chapter are not
necessarily the primary focus of this paper, they are still relevant as they provide a context for
the severity of the problem, which China is attempting to address with the three projects
examined in the remaining chapters. This chapter should provide the context for why China‘s
central government has so heavily invested in multiple attempted solutions aimed at reducing
potable water shortages, and the possible stakes at risk should these projects fail.
25

Southerland, Matthew, Iacob Koch-Weser, and Angela Zhang. "China-India Relations: Tensions Persist Despite
Growing Cooperation." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 2014.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff Report_China-India Relations--Tensions Persist
Despite Growing Cooperation_12 22 2014.pdf.
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CHAPTER 2: SOUTH NORTH RIVER TRANSFER PROJECT
2.1 SNRT Project Background
Image 126

South North River Transfer Project Map

China‘s SNRT project is divided into three major sections (Image 1), the eastern and
central routes that have already been completed, and the western route set for completion in
2050.27 The ultimate goal of the project is to redirect approximately 44.8 billion cubic meters of
fresh water from the Yangtze River in Southern China, to the water stressed region of Northern
26
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27
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China.28 The project is allegedly based on a 1952 quote from Mao Zedong ―there is plenty of
water in the south, not much water in the north, if at all possible; borrowing some water would
be good.‖29 This reengineering of China‘s geographically unequal distribution of water
represents one of the world‘s largest and most expensive engineering projects.30
Image 231

SNRT Project Eastern Route

Construction of the eastern route of the project (Image 2) was completed in 2013.32 The
route consists primarily of an upgrade to China‘s Grand Canal and increasing the amount of

28
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water drawn from the Yangtze River into the Jiangdu canal.33 The water is then transferred
through multiple pumping stations along the Grand Canal, through a tunnel constructed under the
Yellow River and finally into reservoirs near the city of Tianjin.34 In total, the eastern route of
the SNRT project is just over 1,152 km long, with 23 pumping stations and a power capacity of
454 megawatts.35
Image 336

SNRT Project Central Route

The central route of the SNRT project (Image 3) which began operation in December
2014 is designed to divert water from the Yangtze River to Beijing.37 The route runs from the
Danjiangkou Reservoir on the Han River, a tributary of the Yangze River, to China‘s capital city
33
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34
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of Beijing.38 The 1,264 km long canal was constructed in such a way that water was able to flow
down from the Danjiangkou Reservoir to Beijing via gravity without the need to construct
pumping stations. However, the route did require the construction of a tunnel to allow water to
flow under the Yellow River.39 The plan included raising the height of the Danjiangkou Dam
from 162 m to 176.6 m above sea level, in order to increase the reservoir‘s overall water level.40
Image 441

SNRT Project Western Route

The western route (Image 4) the final stage of the SNRT project, is currently in the
planning stages is expected to be completed by 2050.42 The western route will divert water from
the Tongtian, Yalong, and Dadu rivers, tributaries of the Yangtze, to the Yellow River.43 To
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complete the route multiple dams, tunnels, and canals will need to be constructed.44 The
Tongtian line will be 289 km long, the Dadu line will be 30 km, and the Yalong line will be 131
km.45 Overall the route is planned to divert 3.8 billion m3 of water across the Bayankala
Mountains to Northwestern China.46
Although this paper will reference the environmental and financial impact incurred by the
SNRT project as a whole, the majority of this paper will focus on the impact of the central route
completed December 2014. Since the central route supplies water directly to Beijing, it is
comparable to desalination and the IBT pricing scheme both of which are also aimed at bringing
relief to Beijing‘s water shortages. Overall, the central route is the section of the SNRT project
which best exemplifies the impact of the SNRT project on China‘s urban residential water usage,
the primary focus of this research.

2.2 SNRT Project Distributional Equality
Relocation:
The central route of the SNRT project required the relocation of 300,000 residents from
Hebei province, whose houses and property were submerged once the route became
operational.47 Residents had the option either to retreat from the rising water while still staying in
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the same county, or relocate to a new town or city outside the county.48 Although this decision
was supposed to be left up to the individual residents, local officials came under criticisms for
pressuring residents to relocate outside the county rather than simply retreat.49
This pressure to relocate outside their home county is likely the result of lessons learned
from the Three Gorges Dam relocation process. During the construction of the Three Gorges
Dam, roughly a million residents lost their homes, with the vast majority of them choosing to
retreat and remain in Wushan County.50 The biggest problem that arose during this relocation
process was an insufficient amount of land within Wushan County to allow the large number
displaced residents to be able to stay within the county make a living by means of agriculture.51
Local governments hope that by forcing residents, displaced by the central route of the SNRT
project, to relocate outside their current county, these residents will have access to better job
opportunities, more land, and will lower the risk of potential water pollution.52
The local governments compensated displaced residents.53 According to government
officials, each resident‘s compensation package was different, based off a formula that took into
account former land holdings and the value of resident‘s former home.54 In general the standard
relocation package included a newly built home, 0.1 hector of land, and an annual stipend of
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roughly 600 RMB (88 USD) per person for 20 years.55 Relocated residents often left behind
house that they built themselves.56 Many complained that the government erected their new
homes too quickly, and there are multiple reports of shoddy construction, including cracked
foundations.57Additionally, the 0.1 hectors of land was often much less than the amount of land
residents been forced to give up. Such small plots of land, often in worse soil conditions did not
allow for the majority of residents to be able to continue with the type of agriculture they had
been pursuing prior to their relocation.58 Residents who relocated to new towns also often faced
social tensions and were unwelcome by their new neighbors.59 Such unsatisfactory compensation
has resulted in violent outbursts between migrants and local residents, as well as ―demonstrations
in Qianjiang by migrants protesting‖ the government‘s insufficient compensation.60
Despite the seemingly generous opportunity offered to residents through relocation, many
in Hebei were reluctant to leave. Relocation, for many residents meant the end of an agrarian
lifestyle that they had enjoyed for generations.61 Additionally, once relocated residents will no
longer be able to pay proper respects to their ancestors, for even those graves that were not
submerged became too far of a journey for family members to make once they had relocated
outside the province.62 Finally, perhaps the largest concern of those relocatin is the loss in
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―guanxi‖ or relationships.63 Relocating for majority of residents meant permanent separation
from kinship networks and other local friendship networks, which they have developed over their
lifetime.64 Many residents worried that they would not be able to replicate such relationships
once they had relocated to more urban areas, fearing urban lifestyles would be too impersonal.65
Even those residents retreating to a new rural environment within their home province,
still faced the prospect of adapting to unfamiliar land, learning to have to grow new crops, and
losing the expertise they have developed over a lifetime.66 Additionally, those who remain near
the water source face the added challenge of a ban on pesticides and other chemicals, a measure
meant to decrease the threat of pollution to the water source.67 As a result of these struggles,
regardless of whether the residents relocated to an urban environment, or simply retreated further
into the same county, both groups still faced large challenges that required them to completely
change their lifestyle. Overall, the relocation processes embodies the distributional inequality of
the central route of the SNRT project, as thousands of South China residents were forced to
sacrifice to help provide their northern counterparts with a supply of potable water.

South to Sacrifice for the North:
Slogans such as ―supporting the south-north water diversion is an unshakable duty,‖
―ensure clean water gets to Beijing,‖ and ―sacrifice the small family for the big family,‖ all make

Guardian, September 9, 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/gallery/2011/sep/09/china-south-northwater-diversion-project-in-pictures.
63
"A Village Sacrificed For China's Greater Good." Yang, Lei . NPR All Things Considered. Louisa Lim . 4 Oct.
2010. Web. Transcript.
64
Losing kinship networks
65
Human Sacrifice for South-North Water Diversion Project （为调水工程而牺牲）. China: CCTV. Film.
66
"Chinadaily：Water from Hebei Eases Beijing Water Shortage." North South Water Diversion.
http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/zx/english/3/201111/t20111129_203812.html.
67
Chao, Liang. "Pollution Still Hinders Water Diversion." China Daily, July 10, 2010.
http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/zx/english/3/201111/t20111129_203801.html.

22

clear the fundamental distributional inequality of the construction of the SNRT project.68 The
central route of the SNRT project forces the South to bear the burden of sacrifice for the water
scarce north.69 Overall, the South is sacrificing ―44.8 billion cubic meters of water per year from
the Yangtze River in southern China to the Yellow River Basin in arid northern China.‖70
Although it is Northern China that will experience the potential benefits of the SNRT project‘s
central route, Southern China will not remain unaffected. As will be discussed later on in the
chapter, large amount of diverted water will affect, not only the many residents of Southern
China displaced by the project, but also ecosystems and industry located in the South.

2.3 SNRT Political Feasibility:
Official Opposition:
There can be little doubt that the SNRT project is controversial. There have been those
who applauded China‘s ingenuity in attempting to overcome natural geographic water disparities,
while at the same time there have also been those who opposed the project as it poses a large
environmental threat to multiple river ecosystems and increases the risk of pollution because of
the redirection of water through new channels and reservoirs71. Finally, there have been those
who at every stage have questioned whether this project with its large price tag, will even truly
68
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be effective at relieving water shortages in Northern China, and suggest that perhaps the money
would have been better invested into projects that encourage water conservation or more
effective conversion of wastewater.72
What is surprising is that many officials in China have voiced publicly their criticisms of
the project. Ma Jun the director of China‘s Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs
(IPE), Zhang Jinsong the deputy director of the Jiangsu office of the SNRT project, and Zou
Qingping the deputy chief of the Hubei Province bureau of environmental protection, have all
publicly voiced their concerns over the central route of the SNRT project, particularly their
reservations over the project‘s environmental impact, yet those higher up in the party such as
premier Li Keqiang, current president Xi Jinping, and former president Hu Jintao have all
professed their continued support for the project since its start in 2002.73 Overall, the finer points
of these officials‘ support or opposition are less important than the fact that within the
authoritarian state that is China, there exists such a vocal opposition to a state sponsored project.
It is likely that these disagreements among public officials are due to the magnitude of the SNRT
project, and therefore the magnitude of associated risks and benefits.
It is important to note two aspects of this official discontent with the project. First,
although there have been those officials who have publically disagreed with the SNRT project,
72
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their criticisms have not affected and likely will not affect the continuation or completion of the
project. This is because those who have publicly disagreed with the project are largely a small
minority of officials, and typically do not hold very ranking positions.74 Therefore, though there
are officials who have expressed reservations over the continuation of the project they did not
affect ultimate the competition of the central route nor will they likely noticeably impact the
construction of the remaining western route.
Secondly, among those officials who disagree with the SNRT project, their criticism for
the most part revolves around the project‘s environmental impact. Though the environmental
impacts of the three routes are disputed, what is not disputed is the need for China to solve its
current urban residential water shortages. Northern China is currently using water at an
―unsustainable rate.‖75 Beijing, with an average annual water supply of only 100 m3 per person,
suffers from a water scarcity that is on par with Saudi Arabia.76 Therefore, though Chinese
officials may to some extent debate the environmental costs of the SNRT project, they are not
necessarily denying that the state should intervene to reverse national water shortages. The extent
of the water scarcity in Northern China, is likely enough to overcome the majority officials‘
reservations on the potential negative environmental impacts of the SNRT project, which will
therefore likely not impede the political feasibility of the project going forward.
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National Pride:
In successfully completing this project, China‘s central government has the opportunity
to once again lay claim to having constructed the world‘s largest engineering project.77 The
successful completion of the SNRT project will no doubt be a source of national pride for
China‘s central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP will have
redirected nature in an attempt to overcome chronic water shortages in Northern China.78 As this
particular project is potentially, an object of national pride it only increases the political pressure
to successfully complete the SNRT project. Although many consider the project controversial,
once the central government committed to starting the project in 2002, despite the multiple
delays and overages in the budget, all three sections are still likely to be completed.79 This is
likely because the SNRT project will be a testament to the efficiency of China‘s central
government. The central government may hope to be able to inspire national pride by
undertaking a massive feat of engineering so as to overcome natural geographic water shortages
in China, demonstrating that even forces of nature can be bent to their will.

Continued Delays in Construction:
Thus far, both of the completed segments of the SNRT project, the eastern and central
routes have been delayed well past their expected completion dates.80 Construction on the
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project‘s central route began in December of 2003.81 Although the project was originally set for
completion by the start of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, the route did not become
operational until December 2014.82 The hope originally was that the central route would be able
to supply Beijing with a much needed increase in potable water prior to the start of the 2008
games.83 However, by September 2008 construction had only been completed on 307 km of the
1,267 km route.84 The project was then on track to be finished by 2010, but was delayed again
until 2014 because unforeseen environmental concerns, which required the expansion of the
Danjiangkou reservoir.85
What these continued delays in construction demonstrate is that China‘s central
government has vastly under estimated the amount of time needed to complete a set of such
massive engineering projects.86 Additionally, the environmental impact of the project has been
the aspect of the SNRT project that the central government appears to have most overlooked and
has resulted in the greatest amount of delays. For in both the eastern and central routes, the need
to postpone the projects‘ completion in order to try to mitigate unanticipated environmental
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consequences have caused the projects‘ the longest delays.87 Due to these long delays, overall the
SNRT project will likely continue to drain the central government‘s budget well through 2050.88

2.4 SNRT Project Cost Effectiveness:
Over Budget:
Originally, the budget for the entire SNRT project was 53.7 billion RMB. However,
China‘s central government has already surpassed this with the final construction cost of the
eastern and central routes totaling approximately 254.6 billion RMB (37.44 billion USD).89 The
cost of the SNRT project is likely only to increase as the construction continues on the western
route of the project through 2050. The final total cost of the SNRT project is now estimated to
be approximately 79.4 billion USD, more than twice the cost of the Three Gorges Dam.90 This is
not only one of the largest, but also one of the most expensive engineering projects a country has
ever undertaken.91 This ever-increasing budget‘s failure to thus far derail the completion of the
SNRT project demonstrates the central government‘s commitment to solving the current water
shortages in Northern China, particularly in cities such as Beijing.
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Negative Impact on Local GDPs:
The central government‘s massive budget for the project fails to take into account the
additional costs borne by local governments, many of which will face notable decreases in local
GDPs as a result of the SNRT project. Such decreases in local GDPs are not only the result of
reductions in arable land due to flooding to expand reservoirs, but also because of the increased
environmental regulations put in place to protect the water supply.92 The new regulations that
include restrictions on both local agricultural and industry pollution have forced multiple local
governments along the route of the SNRT project, to sacrifice economic development for
environmental protection.93 Some local governments, such as China‘s Shennongjia district, have
asked for ―financial subsidies to make up for potential losses in local GDP.‖94 Though local
governments have yet to receive any such subsidies, the case of Shennonjia indicates financial
costs incurred by local governments because of SNRT project.

Money Diverted From Conservation:
The money the CCP has invested, and will continue to invest in the SNRT project
represents money that will not be available to invest into water conservation in China. In fact,
some experts believe that were the money instead invested into better waste management
facilities, rainwater collection, and other projects geared towards water conservation, it is
possible that mega cities, such as Beijing, could solve or significantly decrease current potable
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water shortages.95 By choosing to pursue this massive engineering project, China‘s central
government has demonstrated its commitment to a supply-driven rather than a demand-driven
method for solving water shortages. However, focusing on increasing the supply of potable water
rather than decreasing the demand for water has thus far proved to be a more expensive and
environmentally harmful method of combating water shortages in China.

An Incomplete Solution:
Although the SNRT project is divided into three different major sections, problems
caused by the project, have forced the central government to invest even more money into
multiple additional minor water projects.96 One example of this occurred upon completion of the
central route of the SNRT project. The central routed caused the water level of the Han River to
fall.97 This falling water level will likely have a large impact on fishing, transportation, and
agricultural production in multiple villages that depend on the Han River for their livelihood.98
As a result, a ―10-billion-yuan package of minor projects have been formulated to reduce the
impact of the water diversion projects on the Han River.‖99 The main aspect of this additional
minor project will consist of the construction of a 67 km man made canal that will give the Han
river access to water from the Yangtze river, in order to supplement for water lost as a result of
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the SNRT project.100 This 10 billion yuan construction package is likely just the first of many
more packages that the government will have to invest in order to alleviate problems created by
the SNRT project. The cost of these minor projects will be in addition to 254.6 billion RMB
already spent on the construction of the central and eastern routes.101 Demonstrating that in terms
of cost effectiveness, the construction of the SNRT project, as thus far been little more than a
continual drain on the budgets of both the central and local governments.

2.5 SNRT Environmental Impact:
Increased Pollution in the South:
One of the largest shortfalls of the central route of the SNRT project is that the design of
the project increases the likelihood that the supply of the water diverted by the project becomes
polluted. As stated earlier, central route siphons water from China‘sYangtze River in order to
supplement the Han River.102 By diverting the water of the Yangtze River water down unnatural
channels, the central route lowered the water level of the Yangtze River.103 Lower water levels,
leave the Yangtze River more susceptible to pollution, since there is now simply less water in the
river to dilute polluted waste and run-off.104
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At present approximately 40% of the China‘s wastewater is dumped into the Yangtze
River.105 The completion of the central route of the SNRT project will make this pollution more
toxic by leaving less water in the Yangtze River dilute it. This will likely have adverse effects on
the biodiversity of the Yangtze River, as well as on agricultural production conducted near the
river, and on residents who depend on water from the Yangtze River.106 Though the underlying
cause of the water pollution does not necessarily lie with the SNRT project, the construction of
the central route further exacerbated the problem, increasing the threat of water pollution in
Southern China.107

Increased potential for Pollution in the North:
When the central route of the SNRT project became operational, the water level of the
river in Xiangyang City, the first big city downstream from the Danjiangkou Dam, dropped by
41 cm and could continue to drop to as much as 78 cm.108 The lowering the river‘s water level
will likely have a range of adverse environmental consequences. One example of this is the one
third of fish species that could now face extinction, because of threats to winter breeding grounds,
increased levels of pollution, and temperature changes in the water.109
As in Southern China, lower water levels in Northern China make it more difficult for
rivers to be able to clean themselves, and pollution levels will likely become more toxic
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overtime.110 Unless the government implements proper management of that stretch of the river, a
range of environmental and ecological problems could arise.111 Additionally, the amount of time
during which the river would be navigable could decrease making water transportation less
efficient and shipping more costly.112
These harmful environmental consequences of the central route of the SNRT project on
this segment of the river, also increases the likelihood that the water that eventually reaches cities
such as Beijing, will likely be undrinkable because of high level of pollution.113 Furthermore,
this demonstrates that the damaging environmental and ecological impacts of this route of the
SNRT project are not limited to Southern China, but like the water from the project will flow
North affecting cities such as Beijing.114

The SNRT Project Does Not Create Clean Water:
The central route of the SNRT project does provide Northern China with increased
amounts of water; however, this project does not guarantee the quality of the diverted water.115 It
is not enough to simply supply cities with a high quantity of water if the quality of the water is
highly polluted and ultimately unpotable. As discussed earlier, the central route of the SNRT
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project increases the susceptibility of the diverted water to pollution.116 Overall, the SNRT
project demonstrates the focus of the central government on increasing water quantity rather
than water quality.
There are very few mechanisms in place within the project, which guarantees that the
water diverted to Northern cites, meets minimum baseline quality standards.117 The government
has put some mechanism in place along the central route to help prevent water pollution,
including constructing an ecological forest preserve of some 356,667 ha (881,342 acres) around
the Danjiangkou reservoir; establishing erosion control measures throughout 680 ha (1,680 acres)
immediately surrounding the reservoir; and shutting down more than 800 small, but heavily
polluting businesses.118 However, these measures are preventive rather than proactive in nature.
They allow the government to stop further pollution of the water, but do not have the means to
clean water that has already been polluted by the time it is diverted by the central route of the
SNRT project.
Additionally, the responsibility for purifying the water, and bearing the costs of
constructing and maintaining water cleaning faculties has fallen to the shoulders of the local
governments of towns and cities in North China.119 Many of these local governments have begun
to balk at the high price tag associated with purifying the water diverted from the SNRT
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project.120 Therefore, though the central route of the SNRT project to some extent solves the
water scarcity in numerical terms, it fails to address the problem of water pollution, an issue that
is intricately intertwined with issue of water scarcity in China.

2.6 SNRT Project Overall Conclusion:
The Amount of Water Provided:
Table 1121
Water resource

Beijing’s Total Water Resources
Billion cubic meter per year

Remarks

Groundwater

2.0

Local Rivers

1.0

Variable

Reclaimed Water

0.3

Estimated

South-North Water Transfer

0.3

Total

3.6
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The data from Table 1 shows the breakdown of the total water resources available to
Beijing after the competition of the central route of the SNRT project.122 These numbers are
based on projections of the total water resources available to Beijing in 2014, after the SNRT
project‘s central route begins operation in 2015.123 If the projected 3.6 billion m3 per year were
divided by Beijing‘s population of approximately 21 million in 2014, the amount of water
available annually to individual Beijing residents would be approximately 170 m3.124 Such a low
annual per capita water level would place Beijing in a state of water stress according to United
Nations‘ standards.125 This data would suggest, that the central route of the SNRT project will
likely be inadequate in solving Beijing‘s current water scarcity. Diverted water from the South is
simply insufficient to quench Beijing‘s massive thirst for potable water.

Increasing Population Pressures:
Perhaps the biggest shortfall of the SNRT project is that once the project is complete,
China‘s central government cannot increase the capacity of water transferred by project in order
to meet the demands of rising population pressures in cities such as Beijing. Beijing‘s
population in 2010 was 19.6 million people, and by 2020, the population is projected to increase
by 20% to reach upward of 25 million.126 Increasing population pressure will only further
exacerbate Beijing‘s current level of water stress. Though the SNRT project will help to alleviate
some of the water stress experienced by Northern Chinese cities such as Beijing and Tianjin,
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once the project begins to operate at full capacity, this massive engineering project cannot be
expanded to increase water flow in order to meet the pressures of raising urban populations.127

Water Shortages in Southern China:
The 9.5 billion gallons of water supplied annually to Northern China by the central route
of the SNRT project represents water diverted from Southern China to meet the needs of
Northern China.128 This water supplied to Northern China is water that is now unavailable to
those in Southern China. Historically, Southern China has not suffered from the water shortages
that plague Northern Chinese cities.129 This is basis of the reasoning behind the SNRT plan, first
suggested by Mao Zedong in the 1950s as a simple solution to China‘s natural water disparity by
the having, the South ―share‖ their excess water with the North.130
However, there are two fundamental problems with Mao‘s logic. The first is that though
three fifths of China‘s water is located in the South, China‘s rapid industrialization has increased
water pollution and left a large proportion of this water unsuitable for transfer to Northern
China.131 As already discussed, SNRT project compounds these pollution problems because of
the increased risk for pollution along the newly constructed channels.132
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The second flaw of this plan is that the majority of the water diverted by the central route
comes from China‘s Yangtze River, and there is fear this this project may overstretch the
capacity of the Yangtze River.133 Prior to the start of the construction of the central route, many
areas along the Yangtze had already begun experience water shortages.134 Cities and towns
along the Yangtze that have historically prepared for the impact of the flooding of the Yangtze
River on their communities, are now facing a new unforeseen disaster of drought.135 According
to local officials in 2007 the town of Tongling located on the Yangtze River, experienced its
worst drought in over 30 years.136
According to China‘s National Bureau of Statistics, the cities located along the Yangtze
River account for 41% of China‘s total GDP.137 The Yangtze threads its way through 11
different regions in China, and since China‘s opening up and reform policy (改革开放) water
from the Yangtze has been intensively siphoned off for factories, hydroelectric schemes and
agriculture.138 The result is that water levels of the Yangtze River have continued to drop,
leading some experts to predict that further water diversions of SNRT project will result in water
shortages in Southern China.139 A project, which attempts to solve water shortages in the North
at the cost of potentially creating shortages in the South, is not a viable long-term solution to
water scarcity in China. Though China's water is inequitably distributed geographically, the
solution is not to attempt to reengineer nature to redistribute the water, but rather to focus on
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conservation, and perhaps adapt to the country‘s geography by relocating more water intensive
industries to Southern China.

39

CHAPTER 3: IBT PRICING SCHEME
3.1 IBT Pricing Scheme Project Background:
The CCP designed China's IBT water pricing scheme in order to ―punish‖ intensive water
users by raising their rates, while also slowing down the rate of water usage ―in the face of rising
urbanism.‖140 This tiered pricing system would charge urban residents based off their

monthly water consumption as compared to the national average household rate of
consumption.141 Overall, the first, second and third tier will follow a pricing ratio of
1:1.5:3.142 Those households whose consumption rate is not more than 80% of the
national average household rate of consumption are part of the first tier and will not have
their water rates increased.143 Those residents who use between 80% and 95% of the
national average household rate of consumption will comprise the second tier and
households who use more than 95% will be part of the third tier.144 Those in the third tier
will pay three times the base rate for water, and those in the second will pay one and a
half times the base rate.145
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Table 2146
Residential Volume (m3)

Guangzhou IBT Pricing Outline
Guangzhou Water Tariff Pricing
RMB

USD

0-12

1.98

0.33

12-26

1.98

0.33

27-34

2.97

0.49

34-43

3.96

0.65

>43

3.96

0.65

>62

3.96

0.65

China‘s central government introduced a pilot IBT pricing program in Guangzhou
in 2008, using the rates outlined in Table 2.147 According to official reports, since the
programs implementation residential water consumption in Guangzhou has fallen 8% .148
When the IBT pricing scheme was implemented in Guangzhou the base rate tariff for
water was 1.98 RMB per cubic meter of water (Table 2).149 The ―switch point‖ between
the tier one and tier three, was set at a rate of about 25% above the median consumption
rate (Table 2).150 The central government has expanded the plan, implementing it in other
major cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing.151
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On January 3, 2014 China‘s National Development and Reform Council (NDRC) and the
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) announced that they were
issuing a document outlining the three tiered water tariff system to be implemented in all
Chinese cities by the end of 2015.152 According to their statement, the IBT pricing system is
meant to ―promote sustainable use of water resources and to help conserve water amongst urban
residents.‖153 The document released by the NDRC stated that the pricing scheme would be
implemented under ―strict supervision‖ but that adjustments will be made as necessary, and the
―monitoring process will be transparent.‖154

3.2 Distributional Equality of the IBT Pricing Scheme
North South Distributional Inequality:
The NDRC‘s plan to implement the IBT pricing scheme in all Chinese cities by the end
of 2015, as part of a plan to curb both residential urban water usage, divides China more in
terms of east and west (along China‘s relative urban rural divide) rather than dividing it by north
and south (along China‘s water shortage).
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Image 5

China Water Scarcity Map

Once the IBT plan has been fully implemented, Chinese cities will all be subject to
relatively the same water-pricing scheme. This is intriguing as not all cities in China suffer from
the same severity of water shortages. Water scarcity and shortages have historically always been
more of a problem in Northern China, than in Southern China.155 Although the majority of cities
in China have experienced increased pressure placed on water supplies as a result of rapid
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urbanization, the level of water scarcity differs between cities in Northern and Southern China
(Image 5).156
Nationally the level of water scarcity is inconsistent across China (Image 5). For this
reason the adoption of a single plan for all cities, though undoubtedly better than no change in
the current water pricing system, does not incorporate enough flexibility for individual cities to
be able to adopt and adapt pricing schemes to take into account unique factors that affect each
city‘s individual levels of water scarcity. The adoption of more localized versions of the IBT
pricing scheme would allow for the development of pricing schemes that would better reflect the
use of water as a limited resource in that particular region.

Impact on Urban Residents:
In terms of distributional equality, the most unequal aspect of China's new IBT plan is
that it fails to include China‘s rural areas. However, this urban-rural disparity is not necessarily a
debilitating weakness of the plan, nor does it affect the potential conservation benefits of the plan
in China‘s urban areas. China's urban rural gap is simply too large for the adoption of a single
national IBT pricing scheme to be affective. China‘s urban and rural communities differ greatly
in their use of water, particularly in terms of rural communities‘ heavy dependence on water for
irrigation and agricultural.157 It would simply be too difficult design a single water pricing policy
that was able to reconcile such difference in water consumption.
China's current IBT pricing scheme has been designed specifically for use in China‘s
urban areas. This means although China‘s rural areas will fail to experience any of the
156

Mack, Kate. "FT Alphaville." FT Alphaville Whats Going on with Shale Gas in China and Poland Comments.
July 9, 2013. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/07/09/1560852/whats-going-on-with-shale-gas-in-china-and-poland/.
157
Gleick, Peter. "China and Water." In The World's Water 2008-2009: The Biennial Report on Freshwater
Resources. Washington DC: Pacific Institute for Studies in Developmentt, Enviroment, and Security, 2009.

44

conservation benefits associated with new pricing scheme, it is unlikely that an IBT pricing
scheme designed for implementation in urban areas would be successful in rural China.
Therefore, the urban-rural distributional inequality is not necessarily a weakness of the IBT
pricing scheme, but a necessity dictated by China‘s social dichotomy.

Distributional Equality within the Cities:
After the implementation of the IBT water-pricing scheme in China‘s urban areas, the
burden paying for of rising water costs will be unequal distributed among residents. Those in the
top 5% of water users (residents in the top tier of the IBT scheme) will see their water rates
raised to triple the base rate paid by the majority of urban residents.158 The central government
may have unequally distribution of the costs of increased water tariffs, in order to strike a
balance between increasing prices to reflect the reality of water scarcity in China, while at the
same time protecting social stability by not increasing the financial burden of water on the
majority of urban residents.
The IBT pricing scheme is unlikely to pose a threat to social stability so long as the
majority of urbans residents‘ water tariffs constitute less than 3% of household‘s annual
incomes.159 The 3% threshold for social stability is from a study conducted by China‘s Ministry
of Construction.160 This study stated that if water expenditure was held to 1% or less, households
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would have little to no reaction to the change in water pricing policy, at 2% households would
begin to ―become more aware of water usage,‖ while 3% was designated the threshold at which
―water expenditure is too large to exceed the affordability of household.‖161 When this data is
compared to China‘s pricing scheme, where those in the top tier would be charged prices that
account for approximately 2.4% of household income, even those in the top tier of the new
pricing scheme should still fall below the 3% threshold.162 According to this data, the probability
of increasing water-pricing leading to the threshold of large-scale urban social unrest is relatively
low.
Additionally, the Chinese government views access water as an inherent right of the
population, a viewed shared by the majority of people in China.163 As an inherent right, water
must be an affordable resource, and should not be a financial strain for the average Chinese
household. Due to this belief in the right to water, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will
raise prices on the bottom tier as doing so would mean raising prices on 80% of urban residents,
violating their perceived right to inexpensive water, and in doing so perhaps posing a threat to
social stability.
The unequitable distribution of water tariffs is rational, as water is an essential element of
daily life in China and drastically increasing the majority of urban residents' water tariffs would
likely result in adverse political, social and economic consequences.164 China's implementation
of a new IBT scheme plan seeks to increase urban residents' awareness as to the current state of
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water shortages, while placing the finical burden on only a small segment of China‘s urban
population to avoid such threats unrest.

The Relationship Income and Support:
A report submitted to the World Bank by Zhang Shiqiu, Deng Liangchun, Yue Peng, Cui
Huishan from Beijing University‘s College of Environmental Studies and engineering, lays out
data that suggests that there is a relationship between household income and support for an IBT
pricing system.165 Of the 200 households surveyed in Beijing, when asked which aspect of water
they ―care the most about,‖ 50% of households‘ whose monthly income was less than 100 RMB
person, indicated that price was most important.166 This percentage steadily decreases as the
households‘ income increases with only 26.9% of households‘ earning more than 5000 RMB per
month indicating that price was most important.167
Table 3168

Beijing Resident Water Survey Continued
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There are two overall conclusions drawn from Table 3. First, it is clear that residents in
all income categories perceive water quality to be a more important issue than water pricing.169
This would imply that for any plan the government wishes to implement that affects residential
water supply, linking the potential plan with improving residential water quality would likely
increase the amount of popular support the plan would receive.
Table 4170

Secondly, there appears to be at least a loose relationship between household income and
concern with water prices.171 Lower income families tend to be more concerned with water
prices than those with higher monthly incomes do.172 This is unsurprising as water represents a
greater financial burden for lower income families. This coupled with the data displayed in Table
4 indicates that lower income families are less likely to be supportive of water pricing reform.
This again is logical as lower income families likely worry more about the potential financial
burden of increasing water pricings. However, China‘s IBT pricing system appears to reflect this
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concern for lower income families, as it is likely that the majority of them will not have their
water rates increased even after all cities have implemented the IBT pricing scheme.

3.3 IBT Pricing Political Feasibility:
Factors of Feasibility:
As stated earlier, China‘s central government through the NDRC has set forth guidelines
outlining China‘s new IBT pricing scheme, and has stated that the plan, which has already been
implemented in some of China‘s largest cities, will be implemented in all cities in China by the
end of 2015173. There are numerous factors in play that suggest this program will be successfully
expanded to all cites by the NDRC‘s self-imposed 2015 deadline. This includes the efficiency
with which the Chinese government has in the past been able to implement nationwide reforms,
due to the centralized nature of China‘s authoritarian government. Additionally, since the
majority of residents in the cites where the plan is set to be implemented will experience no
change in their current water tariff, there is little impetus for citizens to resist or impede the
plan‘s implementation. Finally, as will be discussed in depth later in this chapter, Chinese local
officials now have direct incentive from the central committee to ensure reforms in water
management policy are fully implemented. All of these factors combined point towards the
likelihood that China‘s central government will have successfully implemented the IBT pricing
scheme into all cities by the end of 2015.
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The Impact of Water Management:
Since 1978, one of the drawbacks of China‘s merit based promotion system for
government officials has been an overwhelming reliance on economic growth as the main
criteria in evaluating cadres. Consequently, local officials overzealous in their attempts to meet
the promotion criteria set forth by the central government have enacted policies to pursue high
growth rates while disregarding the impact on the environment and natural resources.174 Only
recently, has the government begun to focus on environmental conservation, and integrated it as
part of the criteria considered in evaluating cadres.175 Prior to the announcement in April 2014 of
the plan to implement the IBT water pricing scheme in all Chinese cites, China‘s NDRC also
introduced a plan in February 2014 to factor ―water management‖ as one of the criteria used by
the government to judge the performance of local officials. 176 Many hope that this new system
will require Chinese officials to become more accountable for the environmental impacts of
China‘s record-breaking economic growth.177
The impact of adding ―water management‖ as part of the criteria by which local cadre are
evaluated and thereafter implementing the IBT pricing scheme is two-fold. First, the addition of
―water management‖ and other criteria that place value on environmental conservation,
demonstrates the changing priorities of China‘s central government, and the extent to which
China‘s top leaders are beginning to realize the need for China to adopt policies that strike a
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balance between economic growth and the preservation of natural resources and the environment.
Second, the criteria of ―water management‖ will likely mean that policies, such as the IBT
pricing scheme, will not only be enacted but also enforced to their fullest extent by local officials,
as these officials now have a direct incentive for the pricing scheme and other water saving
policies to be successful.

3.4 China’s IBT Pricing Scheme Cost Effectiveness
Comparison to the Los Angeles Model:
In the case of China‘s IBT pricing scheme, it is difficult to determine the future cost
effectiveness of a plan that has not yet been fully implemented. Therefore, in order to make
assertions as to the plan‘s cost effectiveness, China‘s IBT plan will be compared to a successful
IBT plan previously implemented in Los Angeles in the 1990s. This comparison will determine
the extent to which China‘s IBT plan matches the criteria laid out by the Los Angeles IBT plan.
Los Angeles‘ IBT scheme‘s success was contingent on top tier prices being set at ―the cost of
replacement‖ or a level that was an accurate reflection of local water scarcity.178 China‘s IBT
scheme failing to reflect China‘s current national level of water scarcity would likely undermine
the effectiveness of the plan in solving current urban residential water shortages.
Los Angeles introduced increases in residential water prices in the 1990s based on a
three-tiered pricing scheme that is similar to the one which China has planned to implement.179
The LA plan was designed so that the price point paid by those in the bottom tier of the pricing
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scheme reflected the average cost of water.180 If China‘s IBT is to imitate the LA model, those
in the bottom tier, 80% of urban residents, should be paying the current average price for water
in China.
Currently, average water price in China is approximately 0.8% of urban households‘
annual income.181 However, a report from China‘s NDRC indicates that a water tariff that
constituted 2.5-3.0% of a household‘s annual income would be a price that would accurately
reflect China‘s limited water recourses.182 Although the gap implies that the current baseline
price of water is not an accurate reflection of the water scarcity currently faced by China, this
does not necessarily imply that the government needs to adjust the base price to account for
water scarcity. Based on the Los Angeles model, the increased prices in higher pricing tiers
should be able to supplement for such water shortages.
According to the Los Angeles model, the price paid by the top block should reflect the
true price of water.183 The true price of water is ―the real price of scarcity.‖184 This price should
reflect the current state of water scarcity in China. As part of China‘s IBT plan, residents in the
top tier‘s water price will increase to three times the amount paid by those in the bottom tier.
Therefore, if residents in the bottom block are paying 0.8% of their income, those in the top
block will pay approximately 2.4% of their household‘s annual income. This would appear to put
China just short of being in line with the Los Angeles plan, as according to China‘s NDRC 2.5%
is the minimum price level needed to account for water scarcity in China.185
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However, the long-term success of China‘s IBT plan is contingent on the current base
rate paid by residents in the bottom tier accurately reflecting the price of the average cost of
supply of water in China, as the prices paid by the other two tiers are determined based off the
bottom tier‘s price. There has been no indication from China‘s central government that has plans
to unilaterally increase the base price of water for residents in all urban areas.186 Yet, if the base
level price is inadequate then the tiered pricing system will fail to have a sustainable impact on
water conservation in China‘s urban areas.

Hong Kong Base Level Water Price Comparison:
By comparing average price of water in mainland China (the baseline price of the IBT
scheme) to the average price of water in Hong Kong, it is possible to judge roughly the accuracy
of the current baseline prices of China‘s IBT scheme. Overall, Hong Kong is the best city to
make such a comparison to mainland China. Due to its proximity, Hong Kong suffers from a
level of water stress similar to many of the cities in China that will be subject to price reform.
Additionally, because of the one country two-system policy (一国两制)187 in place in China,
Hong Kong‘s water prices more accurately reflect market prices, as they are not subject to as
strict of government controls and subsidies.188 Therefore, the Hong Kong prices may be a more
correct representation of accurate baseline prices.
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The baseline price for water in Hong Kong is 4.16 HKD or 0.55 USD.189 While in
Guangzhou, one of the cities in China to have already implemented the new IBT pricing scheme,
the baseline price is 1.98 RMB or 0.33 USD.190 From this data, it is evident that residents in
Hong Kong are paying a base average rate almost double that of mainland China. This would
imply that even if China‘s tiered prices scheme were to be successfully implemented in all cities,
the program would be insufficient to make up for China‘s water shortage as base prices are set
too low.

3.5 IBT Pricing Scheme Environmental Impact:
Water Quality and Quantity:
Table 5191

Beijing Resident Water Survey

Answers to Question “What do you care most about water?”
Income of Respondents
(RMB)
Respondent Numbers
Number
Quality
Percentage
Number
Quantity
Percentage
Number
Price
Percentage
Number
Pressure
Percentage

Less than
1000
36
30
83.3%
2
5.6%
18
50.0%
2
5.6%

1000 ~
2000
56
50
89.3%
2
3.6%
24
42.9%
1
1.8%

189

2000 ~
3000
54
50
92.6%
4
7.4%
17
31.5%
1
1.9%

3000 ~
5000
28
27
96.4%
1
3.7%
10
35.7%
0
0.0%

Above
50000
26
23
88.5%
2
7.7%
7
26.9%
0
0.0%

Total
200
180
90%
11
5.5%
76
38.0%
4
2.0%
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Table 3 indicates is that across all income groups in China the largest concern among
urban residents is water quality. Table 5 makes clear that of the 200 households surveyed, the
majority192 ranked water quality as more and/or equally ―important‖ than water pricing.193 This
emphasis on water quality is significant because though the IBT pricing scheme poses little to no
direct threat of worsening water pollution, altering the price of water in urban areas does not
change the quality of water provided to residents. Beijing, the city in which the survey was
conducted, suffers from both water increasing shortages and declining water quality.194 The
implementation of the IBT pricing scheme in Beijing, will therefore not be able to solve
problems in water quality, the aspect of water with which local residents are most concerned.195
This is an inevitable limitation of China‘s IBT plan and there is very little that the central or local
governments can do to modify the pricing scheme to improve water quality.

3.6 IBT Pricing Scheme Overall Conclusions:
Tariff Threshold for Water Conservation:
The extent to which adopting at tiered pricing system will be effective in terms of its
environmental impact is largely dependent on the extent to which it is able to promote individual
urban residents to conserve water. The adoption of an IBT scheme may help make urban
192
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residents aware of water shortages and by doing so may promote them to make lasting life-style
changes in their use of water.196 However, in order to be effective China‘s IBT plan must find a
balance between the percentage of annual household income spent on water tariffs needed to
insight immediate changes in residential water usages and the threshold at which the percentage
of income becomes so large that it poses a threat to social stability.
In order to have the greatest impact on water conservation China‘s cities would need to
adopt an IBT plan that would adjust the water prices in such a way that the largest possible
number of participants were paying a water tariff that constituted a large enough percentage of
their annual income so as to encourage them to change their water usage habits. According to a
report by the World Bank, 5% is the threshold for the percentage of a household‘s annual income
spent on water, which will prompt immediate short-term changes in households‘ water
consumption patterns.197
China has not designed the recently adopted IBT scheme in such a way that majority of
urban residents‘ water tariffs will constitute 5% of their annual income.198 The IBT plan in its
current form only alters the price of water for the top 20% of users.199 For the majority of urban
residents, whose water tariff rates will remain unchanged, and the water tariff will only constitute
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approximately 1% of their annual household income.200 This base rate water price is unlikely to
be altered and falls well below the 5% of annual household income specified by the World Bank
report. These urban residents in the bottom tier of the pricing scheme are unlikely to feel any
incentive or pressure to alter their current water usage habits. Even those residents in the top tier,
who do experience an increase in their water tariff, will only have water prices raised to
constitute approximately 2.4% of their annual household income.201 This would imply that even
after the IBT pricing scheme has been fully implemented China‘s urban water prices will remain
too low to bring about an immediate changed in urban residential water consumption patterns.
However, though China‘s IBT scheme is unlikely to cause short-term changes in water
consumption patterns, the adoption of this policy may have a long-term impact on China by
altering people‘s mindset towards water conservation. Over the long term, implementing an IBT
pricing scheme may increase China‘s urban residents‘ awareness of water shortages through
expose to the goals of the policy presents to residents through the media and other mediums.
An investigation by the Beijing Municipal Water Conservation Management Center
determined that of the respondents surveyed, over 53% felt that their awareness of water scarcity
in China ―is closely related to [the implementing of] water price reform.‖202As people are made
more socially aware of water shortages in China, this is likely to result in changes over the longterm in urban residential water consumption patterns. Therefore, the impact of adopting an IBT
plan may increase social understanding of water shortages in China, which could manifest itself
200
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in changes in urban resident‘s patterns of water consumption. This, in the long term, might lessen
the severity of water shortage currently faced by urban communities in China.
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CHAPTER 4: DESALINATION PLANTS
4.1 Desalination Plants in China Project Background:
Reverse osmosis (RO) desalination exploits the fact that solutions at different
concentrations will always seek to average out their concentrations.203 Thus, if fresh water and
salt water are kept apart by a porousmembrane, over time the concentration of salt in the salt
water will decrease, while the concentration of salt in the fresh water will increase, until both
approach a similar value.204 To reverse this process, essentially making freshwater from salt
water, the water must be highly pressurized to separate the salt from the water.205
Below are basic steps outlining how RO desalination works (Image 6):
1. Salt water is brought in from the ocean and filtered to keep large living creatures and
waste out of the water.206
2. The salt water is then highly pressurized (to 3000-4000 psi or more than 200 times
atmospheric pressure) using a pump.207
3. This pressurized water is then passed through a porous membrane to separate the salt
from the water.208 The pores are small enough that only water molecules can pass
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through.209 This is the first stage of separation to get the maximum amount of freshwater
output.210 The waste streamed from this process is brine, or high concentration salt
water.211 (Image 7)
4. The brine is then re-pressurized by another pump to pass through another set of
membranes to extract more potable water.212
5. The pressurized brine is passed through another set of membranes, rsulting in a smaller
amount of freshwater, and a more concentrated stream of brine.213
Image 6214

Basic RO Desalination Plant Process

209

Ibid., 2
Ibid., 2
211
Ibid., 2
212
"Water Desalination Processes." American Membrane Technology Association 8 (2007).
http://www.amtaorg.com/wp-content/uploads/8_WaterDesalinationProcesses.pdf.
213
Ibid., 2
214
"Desalination Technologies." Water Industry Network. January 1, 2002.
http://www.roplant.org/index.php?pid=7&sid=2.
210

60

Image 7215

RO Desalination Membrane

Reverse osmosis membranes are typically very expensive due to the precision required
for the construction of such fine membranes.216 However, advances in materials, science and
nanoengineering, specifically the ability to mass produce microscale structures has resulted in a
relatively lower cost for producing the membranes required for RO desalination.217
China‘s two largest RO desalination plants are the Qingdao and Tianjin Dangang RO
desalination facilities.218 Together the two plants supply China with approximately 200,000 m3
of potable water a day.219
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Image 8220

Tianjin Desalination Plant Process

Tianjin‘s RO plant receives feed water from the Bo Sea that has been pretreated using an
ultrafiltration membrane system supplied by Hyflux, a Singapore based company.221 The plant is
designed to produce up to 150,000 m3 a day of potable water222. One of the world‘s largest RO
plants, the Tainjin plant‘s pretreatment system processes approximately 250,000 m3 of seawater
a day.223 Seawater intake pumps deliver the seawater through the pretreatment system to eight

220

I Clemente, Rodney. "China‘s Mega-Desalination Plant Experience: A White Paper on the Long-term Energy
Efficiency of China‘s Largest Desalination Plants." Energy Recovery Inc., 2013.
http://www.energyrecovery.com/sites/default/files/ERI-WP_China MegaPlants_Oct2013.pdf.
221
Spooner, Simon, Wen (华) Hua (温), Xiaotian (晓天) Fu (付), and Lijin (丽锦) Zhong (钟). "Water Energy
Nexus in the Urban Water Source Selection: A Case Study from Qingdao (城市水源选择的水-能源 关联分析：以
青岛为例)." World Resource Institute (世界资源研究所), 2014. http://www.wri.org.cn/files/wri/documents/Water
Energy Nexus in the Urban Water Source Selection_A Case Study from Qingdao.pdf.
222
How much water does it produce a day
223
"Tianjin SDIC Project China‘s Largest Desalination Plant." IDE Technologies. January 1, 2015. http://www.idetech.com/blog/case-study/tianjin-china-project-ide/.

62

independent seawater RO trains, (image 8) each of which is designed to deliver up to 12,500 m3
of treated water a day.224 Equipped with a single main high pressure pump, membrane rack,
energy recovery system and circulation pump, each train runs between 12.5% and 100%
capacity.225
Image 9226

Qingdao Desalination Plant Process

The Qingdao desalination plant provides up to 100,000 cubic meters of drinking water
daily to Qingdao‘s municipal grid.227 The plant began operation in June of 2012, the plant‘s six
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trains supply between 15 and 20 percent of the water used by Qingdao‘s nearly three million
residents.228 The majority owner of the plant is the Spanish company Abengoa. 229 The Qingdao
plant operates similarly to the Tianjin RO plant. Water from the Jiaozhou Gulf is pretreated by
an ultra-filtration (UF) membrane system that processes up to 250,000 m3 of feed water a day.230
Then intake pumps deliver feed water through the UF pretreatment system to three main highpressure pumps and the plant‘s energy recovery system.231 However, unlike the Tianjin plant the
Qingdao plant uses a semi-pressure design, where each high-pressure pump supplies two
membrane trains, though each train still has an individual energy recovery system and circulation
pump.232 (image 9)

http://www.abengoa.com/export/sites/abengoa_corp/resources/gestion_noticias/pdf/20130130_NP_Abengoa_operac
in_comercial_Qingdao_en.pdf.
228
"Desalination Costly Drops." The Economist, February 9, 2013
229
Furest, Bárbara, and Patricia Meléndez. "Abengoa Starts Commercial Operations at the Qingdao Desalination
Plant in China." Www.abengoa.com.
http://www.abengoa.com/export/sites/abengoa_corp/resources/gestion_noticias/pdf/20130130_NP_Abengoa_operac
in_comercial_Qingdao_en.pdf.
230
Clemente, Rodney. "China‘s Mega-Desalination Plant Experience: A White Paper on the Long-term Energy
Efficiency of China‘s Largest Desalination Plants." Energy Recovery Inc., 2013.
http://www.energyrecovery.com/sites/default/files/ERI-WP_China MegaPlants_Oct2013.pdf.
231
Ibid., 23
232
Ibid., 23

64

4.2 Desalination Distributional Equality:
The Distribution of Desalination Plants:
Image 10233

Map of Desalination Plants in China

The distribution of desalination plants in China has thus far been limited to the east coast
making this geographically a rather limited solution to combating water shortages in China. As
looking at the map makes clear only those cities and towns located along China‘s eastern coast
would have access to an abundant enough source of salt water to be able to sustain viable
desalination plants. Though desalination is likely not a solution for the majority of landlocked
Western China, it is also important to consider that China's current population is by no means
equally distributed across the country.
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According to China‘s 2010 census, 57.3% of China's population lived in urban areas with
the most populated cities being Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou, all of which are located on
China‘s eastern coast.234 China‘s National Bureau of Statistics has projected that China‘s urban
population will grow to constitute 60% of China‘s total population by 2020.235 The possible
construction of desalination facilities in such eastern coastal cities would potentially have a large
impact on local water shortages, likely only to be exacerbated by growing populations. This
combination of raising populations and increasing levels of water scarcity make coastal urban
areas the core of China's water shortage crisis. Therefore, despite the limited geographic reach of
desalination, it is still an effective tool in fighting water shortages in China. The construction of
desalination plants could provide a continuous source of potable water directly to coastal cities in
China suffering from water shortages.

The Possibility of Piping Water:
One option to potentially increase the distributional equality of desalination in China
would be to build up a water transportation infrastructure of pipes, which could be used to
transfer water from desalination facilities to other water stressed areas. Currently the best
example of this is the desolation plant in Tianjin that in addition to providing water to its own
municipality also pipes water into Beijing.236 Beijing is considered a severely water stressed city,
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due primarily to geographic factors such as historically low rainfall, rising population pressures,
and rapidly increasing levels of industrialization.237
The piping of desalinated water from Tianjin has been effective as another means used to
increase Beijing‘s dwindling water supply.238 Since 2013, two 275 km long pipelines, each
approximately 1.5 m in diameter, pass through two pumping stations in order to pass potable
water directly to eastern Beijing.239 However, the current success of this project does not
necessarily ensure that other piping projects will be equally effective. The Tianjin-Beijing
pipeline is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the potential impacts of piping desalinated
water to other sites. The relative proximity of the two cites as well as the heavy industrialization
of both cities, provide close to ideal conditions for the piping of desalinated water to occur.
Piping along longer routes could have a negative environmental impact due to the construction of
the required infrastructure that would disrupt local ecosystems, and increase levels of water
pollution. As a result of these potential environmental impacts, desalination is likely to remain a
relatively limited in its distribution.

237

Wong, Edward. "Desalination Plant Said to Be Planned for Thirsty Beijing." The New York Times, April 16, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/world/asia/desalination-plant-beijing-china.html?_r=2.
238
Wong, Edward. "Desalination Plant Said to Be Planned for Thirsty Beijing." The New York Times, April 16, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/world/asia/desalination-plant-beijing-china.html?_r=2.
239
Watts, Jonathan. "Can the Sea Solve China's Water Crisis?" The Guardian. January 24, 2011.
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jan/24/china-water-crisis?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.

67

4.3 The Political Feasibility of Desalination:
Current Government Involvement:
The 11th five-year plan represents the first time desalination is presented as part of the
solution to China‘s water management, and set targets for national desalination output.240 This
indicates that China's central government recognizes desalination as a legitimate and feasible
solution to chronic water shortages. Desalination also appeared as the part of China‘s water
management initiative in the 12th five-year plan, and in 2016 will likely continue to be
incorporated as part of the solution for solving water scarcity in China‘s 13th five-year plan.241
This recognition and support from the central government will likely play an important
role in the development of China‘s future desalination plants in. China is an authoritarian state
and history would suggest that of those projects that are able to have the largest impact on
Chinese society have been those implemented from the top down with the support of China‘s
central government. Therefore, should the Chinese government prioritize the construction of
desalination facilities as a solution to water scarcity, it is likely that the number of desalination
plants in operation in the future would steadily increase.
Despite this potential for expansion, there are two shortcomings that could possibly
prevent the central government from increasing their investment in desalination. The first is that
the CCP has already invested large amounts of time and money into the SNRT project, and hails
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the project as the savior solution to water shortages in Northern China.242 Because of the
emphasies placed by China's central government on the SNRT project, it is likely that there will
be fewer resources and less motivation to finance the construction of desalination plants. The
ever- increasing price tag of SNRT project has required the central government to continue to
pour resources into the project, resources which otherwise could be used to finance the
construction and operation of desalination plants.243
Secondly, as will be examined later China currently lacks a domestic desalination
technology market.244 This means that the majority of the expertise and technology for the
construction of desalination plants will continued to be imported. Cities such as Qingdao, have
dealt with the lack of domestic technology by allowing an outside foreign companies to such as
Spain‘s Abengoa, to use their own expertise and technology to construct a desalination plant in
China.245 However, adopting the strategy of encouraging foreign companies to construct
desalination plants in China, places perhaps too much of the direct control over the development
of desalination outside of the hands of China's central government. Therefore, though China‘s
central government may be reluctant to finance desalination plants, as a result of the SNRT
project, they will also likely be even more reluctant to adopt measures that encourage foreign
control over domestic desalination operations.
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Privatization and Government Regulation:
Even if the central government not wish to invest directly in desalination, in order for the
market to be successful, the central government will still likely need to adopt legislation that
makes the desalination market more appealing and profitable to private companies. The
desalination market in China is still relatively new and developing and as a result is largely
unstructured.246 Only China's central government will be able to provide the structure needed to
make the desalination market in China appealing to private companies.247Private companies will
need to see that desalination is profitable before they are willing to invest in a venture with such
a high startup and operations cost. 248
Currently, upward of 70% of desalination facilities in China are ―financed by the industry
end users or the government.‖249 Nearly 90% of desalinated water in China is currently being
used by key industries such as metal production, nuclear power, and large industrial parks that
are highly centralized and monitored by the government.250 Though the percentage of desalinated
water used for residential purposes is still relatively small, it is one of the fastest growing sector
of the desalination industry. This growth is fueled by an ever-increasing need to overcome
residential water shortages in China.
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As the government currently appears to remain apathetic towards financing the
construction of desalination facilities for residential use, the argument can be made that another
way to finance such projects would be through private firms. These firms potentially could be
either Chinese or foreign, though due to the high cost and relatively novelty of desalination
technology in China, it is more likely that financing would come from foreign firms. One
example of this is the desalination plant in Qingdao, financed by Spanish company Abengoa.251
There are many advantages in privatizing the desalination industry in China. First, coastal
towns and cities in China would be able to enjoy immediate relief from the current and future
water shortages many of them currently face. Additionally, China‘s desalination plants would be
able to take advantage of newer, more advanced, and ecologically friendly foreign desalination
technology, without waiting for a domestic desalination technology industry mature. In terms of
economics, China would also be able to take advantages of these benefits without the need for
the government to allocate funds to finance desalination facilities. By increasing the privatization
of their desalination industry China is able to receive all of the benefits of increased use of
desalination to solve residential water shortages, without the central or local governments
needing to bear the brunt of the financial burden.
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4.4 Desalination Cost Effectiveness:
Expensive Technology:
One aspect impeding the expansion of desalination in China is the high cost associated
with the technology. The high prices of the desalination technology significantly push up the
startup costs for firms looking to enter the market.252 The most prominent type of desalination
technology used in China is the RO process.253 Although RO technology is no longer novel at the
international level, as it has been used by commercial desalination plants for over 50 years, it is
still a relatively new phenomenon in China.254
The most important consequences of the relative newness of this industry in China, is that
Chinese firms have not yet caught up to the global learning curve in terms of RO desalination. In
China, there is currently little domestic development or production of RO desalination
technology.255 Additionally, foreign companies have the patents on much of the world‘s
desalination technology, particularly the newest and most eco-friendly methods of desalination.
This means that Chinese companies must import almost all of the RO technology and equipment
used in desalination, as they cannot purchase it from domestic manufactures. This in turn drives
up the price of constructing desalination facilities in China.
Were desalination to become a more popular and widespread form of combating water
scarcity in China, Chinese companies both privately owned and those sponsored by the
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government would likely have more incentive to direct funds towards developing China‘s own
desalination technology market. This increase in investment in RO technology development
would in turn likely reduce startup costs, thus making desalination a more affordable alternative
to combat water scarcity primarily in China‘s coastal regions. However, this is the contradiction
currently faced by China‘s desalination industry. Until the construction of desalination facilities
is a strategy prominently adopted by China‘s coastal regions to lessen the severity of water
shortages in China, there is little incentive to invest in the domestic development of the
technologies needed for China to be able to run large scale desalination facilities that are both
economically, and environmentally efficient. Although Chinese companies are beginning to
invest in the development of desalination domestic technologies, for this to become a profitable
industry it must expand with the speed necessary to be able to support China‘s potential growing
desalination plants.256
Again, it is likely that the solution to overcoming the current high cost of desalination in
China lies in the Chinese government continued support for the construction of desalination
facilities as a potential solution to water shortages. However, there are currently no government
incentives or funds designated for desalination projects. Financing remains the largest obstacle
preventing Chinese companies with the technology from being able to ―tap into the Chinese
market.‖257 Should the Chinese government begin to make desalination a higher priority it is
likely that this would drive domestic development of RO technology and foster the growth of a
desalination industry in China through lower prices and better technology.
256

Mitchell, Louisa. "Desal in China - Trends & OpportunitiesDesal in China: Trends & Opportunities." China
Water Risk, 2011. http://chinawaterrisk.org/resources/analysis-reviews/desal-in-china-trends-opportunities/.
257
Peng, Jennie, and Fredrick Royan. "Market Report: Developing Desalination in China." Water and Wastewater
International 25, no. 6. http://www.waterworld.com/articles/wwi/print/volume-25/issue-6/regional-spotlight-asiapacific/market-report-developing-desalination.html.
REPORT 2013, 2013. http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH_2013
NHDR_EN.pdf.

73

Low Water Prices:
Perhaps the largest barrier to fostering a successful desalination industry for residential
use in China is low water prices. Due to the limited timeframe of operations RO plants are not
cost effective in areas where freshwater sells for under 0.50 USD per cubic meter, since the
membrane replacement and plant construction costs are never recovered by the desalination plant
operator.258 In China, the CCP subsidizes residential water prices, ensuring that the value of
water is far below market price.259 By keeping water tariffs low, the CCP is able to help
guarantee that all citizens are able to afford water, one of the necessities of life. However from a
business standpoint, foreign companies are unlikely to undertake the arduous process of
constructing and maintaining a desalination plant in China, when start-up costs for such projects
are already incredibly high, and there is a limited timeframe of feasible operation.260 China‘s
low water prices severely restrict the profit such a frame would be able to generate through the
project. This means that there is little incentive for foreign firms, or even private Chinese firms
to invest in such a project without the support and financing of Chinese government, a support
which to date has been limited.

Limited Lifespan:
Another factor, which must be considered when examining the cost effectiveness of
desalination facilities in China, is the longevity of the operations. For example, the Qingdao
desalination plant that began operation in 2010 is only designed to operate for twenty-five years,
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or until 2035.261 Twenty-five years is the typical operational lifespan of the RO desalination
plant.262 This relatively short lifespan is due to the process of RO, which as explained earlier,
works by forcing pressurized saltwater through a membrane filter.263Overtime, these membrane
filters become clogged, and thus unable to remove salt from water.264
There have been some recent developments towards redesigning RO membrane filters so
that they do not become clogged overtime, and there are other methods of desalination such as
forward osmosis (FO) 265which have the potential to offer desalination facilities a longer lifespan.
However, these technologies are still experimental, and are not currently in use in China.
Therefore, desalination facilities in China continue to operate under a twenty-five year lifespan.
This limited timeframe of viable operation is likely to prevent China from being able to attract
increased private financing for desalination facilities. Although firms in the desalination industry
understand that twenty-five years is the limited timeframe under which they can be profitable,
this coupled with China‘s low water prices, and the high cost of startups, do not create an
optimal environment for a the development of a profitable industry.
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4.5 Desalination Environmental Impact
Brine Disposal:
One of the largest environmental hurdles countries encounter when building desalination
plants, is brine disposal.266 Brine is the super concentrated salt by-product that left after the
potable water has been separated during the desalination process.267 The output of brine by
desalination facility can be equivalent of up to 55% of the plant‘s intake flow.268 Therefore, once
seawater has been desalinized and the potable water is removed, the issue remains of how to
dispose of the sizable amount of brine waste left behind by the process.
The simplest method for brine disposal is of course to pipe it back out into the ocean,
through a brine outflow pipe.269 Though this is the easiest method for brine disposal it is also the
least environmentally friendly.270 Since brine has a much higher concentration of salt than the
surrounding seawater and is much denser, when pumped back into the ocean brine tends to settle
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near the seafloor.271 This creates a plum of ultra-salty water on the ocean floor, which can
adversely affect some aquatic ecosystems.272
Another, more environmentally friendly means to dispose of brine is to recycle the brine
by converting it into saltcrete.273 Saltcrete is a compound formed through a mixture of brine, salt,
and cement.274 Many communites that rely on desalination, then often use saltcrete as part of the
mixture for asphalt when paving roads.275 The converting of brine into saltcrete is the most
common form of brine disposal used by desalination plants across the globe.276
The final method of brine disposal is to convert the brine into salt, which the case of the
Tianjin plant is then collected and sold to generate revenue.277 In order to form salt, once
desalination is complete the brine is put through an additional RO process that ―produces very
salt concentrated water.‖278 This concentrated solution is then left to dry out.279 Once all the
water has evaporated, what is left is the salt that the company is then able to repackage and
sell.280 Although the process of recycling brine to form salt is more time and perhaps energy
intensive, it is more environmentally friendly than pumping the brine back into the ocean, and
offers desalination plants an additional revenue source.
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RO and Energy Consumption:
Table 6281

Qingdao’s Water Supply Energy Requirement

The largest environmental concern for China in terms of expanding desalination is the
amount of energy required to operate a RO desalination plant. In order for RO to be effective, the
water must be highly pressurized before it can be pumped through the membrane that draws out
potable water.282 This pressurizing of the water is the most energy intensive aspect of the RO
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desalination process.283 Table 6 indicates that in Qingdao the desalination of seawater consumes
roughly 10 times more energy than the extraction and processing of local surface water.284
Currently in China, coal is the ―dominant energy source, accounting for approximately 79%
of the total electricity produced in 2012.‖285 Much of China‘s current desalination industry is
equally as coal dependent. Therefore, the production of more desalinated water would likely
―simultaneously increase greenhouse gas emissions.‖286This is particularly alarming as China is
already one of the world‘s largest producers of greenhouse gases.287 One study, conducted prior
to the construction of Qingdao‘s desalination plant, indicated that the plant would increase the
city‘s greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 80%.288 Although this number may be a slight
overestimate, especially as the Qingdao plant has yet to operate at full capacity, the construction
of the desalination plant has still likely increased Qingdao‘s overall greenhouse gas emissions.289
The increased energy and environmental costs of desalination are important, as a long-term
solution to China‘s current water shortages should be one in which China does not have to
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choose between maintaining sufficient amounts of potable water, or low levels of environmental
pollution.
One way for China to overcome the potentially adverse environmental effects of
desalination is the method used in the Tianjin desalination plant. In the Tianjin model, the
desalination facility operates in tandem with a local power plant.290 This model recycles the
excess steam produced by the power plant, and harnesses the energy produced by the steam to
pressurize the water in the desalination plant.291 This method of using the steam produced by the
power plant has decreased the amount of energy consumed by the Tianjin desalination plant.292
Thus, the Tianjin desalination plant may represent a model that China could expand upon in an
attempt to strike a balance between water shortages and environmental pollution.

Threat to Marine Biodiversity:
Over the long term, another environmental threat inevitably posed by desalination plants
is the threat to the local marine biodiversity.293 In order to be productive desalination plants rely
on a steady stream of salt water.294 As a result, the majority of desalination facilities are located
on the coast, often built with large pipes that extend directly into the ocean.295 The problem is
that these pipes often inadvertently draw in thousands of plankton, certain types of fish eggs, and
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other microorganisms disrupting local marine biodiversity.296 The inability of these pipes to
separate such organisms from the seawater required by desalination plants, poses a threat in the
long-term to the biodiversity of the local saltwater ecosystems on which the desalination
facilities rely.297 This potential threat to biodiversity is a weakness of the process of desalination
that is difficult to overcome.298 This is a risk that must be taken into consideration, should the
construction of desalination facilities become prevalent in China‘scoastal cities.

4.6 Desalination Overall Conclusions:
Tianjin:
Tianjin and nearby Beijing suffer from some of the highest rates of water scarcity in
China, made worse by the two cities‘ large and ever-growing populations.299 Due to the
population pressures for an increasing water supply, in 2010 China began construction on the
country‘s largest desalination facility in Tianjin.300 The facility opened in 2013, and by 2014 the
plant‘s output had reached approximately 200,000 m3 of water a day.301 At this rate, the plant
would only be able to annually produce 73 million m3 of water.302 Though not unimpactful, the
output of potable water from desalination alone is insufficient to solve Beijing or Tianjin‘s
current water crisis. Beijing alone in 2009 consumed over 1 billion m3 of water for residential
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use.303 This number does not include the city‘s even higher annual industrial consumption of
water.304 This indicates that desalination, though it will undoubtedly help to alleviate some
strains of water shortages, on its own is not enough to solve the water scarcities of either of these
two cities.

Qingdao:
As discussed earlier the Qingdao plant it is only able to produce 100,000 m3 of potable
water a day, enough according to Abengoa, to fulfill the daily water needs of roughly half a
million people.305 Qingdao has an urban population of over 3 million, and a total population of
over 7 million.306 This means that desalination alone is only able to meet the consumption needs
of approximately 16% of the city‘s urban population, and only approximately 7% of total
residential consumption needs.307 This additional output of potable water has undoubtedly aided
Qingdao, relieving some of the water scarcity faced by many northern cities in China. However,
it is clear from the data, as well as the twenty-five year limited timeframe of operation for the
Qingdao desalination plant, that desalination in Qingdao, as in Tianjin is neither a permanent nor
a complete solution to combating residential water shortages.
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Limited Timeframe:
As discussed earlier in the chapter, RO desalination facilities currently being constructed
in China have an operational lifespan of only twenty-five years, due to the clogging over time of
the filtration membranes.308 This limited timeframe of operation dictates, that desalination is not
a long-term solution to China‘s water problems. Even if coastal cities in China were to begin to
rely on desalination to ease current water shortages, this would be the equivalent of simply
putting a very expensive Band-Aid on the problem of urban residential water scarcities.
This is because in twenty-five years when current desalination facilities become
inoperable, those areas that are dependent on them for water will be forced to find another
solution. It is possible that in the future desalination technology will have developed innovations
that increase the operational longevity of desalination plants. Nevertheless, as no such
technology currently exists outside of the experimental phase, this paper must operate under the
assumption that the utility of current desalination plants will be limited to a twenty-five year
operational lifetime.

Failure to Meet Official Output Goals:
As mentioned earlier, China‘s 11th 5-year plan (2006-2011) was the first to mention
desalination.309 Additionally, the plan set target output levels of desalination in China that China
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fell short of meeting.310 Although failing to meet the stated goals a five-year plan is rather
unusual in China, the 12th five-year plan also sets aggressive targets for China‘s coming
desalination output at 2.2 - 2.6 million m3 daily capacity by 2015.311 The continued incorporation
of desalination into China‘s five-year plans is an encouraging sign for the industries development.
However, the conclusion drawn from this chapter is that without additional measures taken to
allocate funding, increase financing, and adopt legislation desalination projects will not be able
to find the momentum they need to become a viable solution to supplying China‘s urban
residential areas with potable water.
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CONCLUSION:

China, particularly China‘s urban residential areas are currently facing water shortages
that if left unsolved will likely not only undermine China‘s economic progress, but could also
threaten the nation‘s political and social stability. In order to combat such water shortages,
China‘s central government has enacted a variety of policies, which seek to solve China‘s water
crisis through a variety of different methods. Overall, the conclusion that can be drawn from this
paper is that of the three projects examined above, each has its own unique strengths and yet
none is capable of on its own completely solving China‘s current urban residential potable water
shortages.
The three projects examined in this research represent the diversity, of both projects that
seek to curb the demand of potable water, as well as projects focused on increasing the supply of
potable water in China. However, there is one aspect of solving China‘s water shortages that
these three project that fail to address; a solution that primarily seeks to increase water
conservation among China‘s urban residents. Increasing water conservation on an individual
level does not necessarily decrease individual residents‘ demand, however it does aid in
increasing the supply of potable water without the need for massive engineering projects as
residents area able to reuse the water already available to them. The inability of any of the three
projects discussed to seek to incentivize individual water conservation is perhaps each project‘s
greatest weakness, as water conservation is the most sustainable means to combat water
shortages in China.
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When examining the current projects constructed to combat China‘s urban water, scarcity
it is important to consider the differences in water scarcity inherent in China‘s geography.
Projects, such as the IBT pricing scheme, that are meant to be unilaterally adopted across China
are weak in that they fail to allow enough individualism to necessarily be the most appropriate
method of dealing with localized issues of water scarcity. Additionally, projects such as the
SNRT project, which seeks to take advantage of the natural disparity in China‘s potable water
distribution, is not sustainable as this project threatens to create water shortages in Southern
China in order to solve water shortages in Northern China.
Additionally, one of the other weaknesses is that projects such as the SNRT project and
the construction of desalination facilities struggle to maintain both a high level of cost
effectiveness and a simultaneously low environmental impact. Any plan that would require
China supply urban residents with potable water at the cost of further environmental denigration
would ultimately prove to be unsustainable.
Overall, perhaps the most viable solution to combating water shortages in China‘s urban
residential areas may not come through the implementation of a single policy, or project. Rather
the unique strengthens and weaknesses inherent in each of the three projects examined above
would suggest that the most sustainable and impactful solution would be to simultaneously
adopting multiple plans and projects. Ultimately to be effective such plans would need to strike a
balance between economic efficiency and environmental conservation, be individualized enough
to suit the localized needs of specific communities, and focus on curbing water demand,
encouraging water conservation while simultaneously seeking to increase the amount of potable
water to China‘s residential areas.
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